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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case N ' ^ 081 ^  C B 
v. : Priority No, 2 
SCOTT ALAN DELANEY, : 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute second degree 
felony, . ™ 
1993), i n the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Juab 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ray M Harding, presiding. 
This Cou-* appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. § b *,c* < ^uyi 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
I Did the t i i a 1 court permissibl rule that t lip" 
offj nil reasonable BUHJJM loni in "
 t defendant's vehicle for 
speeding and further detain defendant t:. investigate his 
suspicion that defendant was transporting illegal n a r f n H ' ^ wh^n 
the M1 1 i c "e i" s\m tl :it s :: ::i :: >:i : :: f i ai i j uana emanating from 
defendant's vehicle? 
court's determinate 
unless clearly erroneous. State v. 
Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987); State v. Leonard, 825 
P.2d 664, 667-68 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 
(Utah 1992). But see State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 (Utah App. 
1991) (applying nondeferential, "correction of error" standard in 
reviewing trial court's reasonable suspicion determination), 
cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
2. Did the trial court properly determine that 
defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his vehicle? 
"[Tjhe trial court's ultimate conclusion that a consent 
was voluntary or involuntary is to be reviewed for correctness [;] 
[however,] [t]he trial court's underlying factual findings will 
not be set aside unless they are found to be clearly erroneous." 
State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 26 (Utah Jan. 7, 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U. S. Const. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
The text of any other pertinent provisions, statutes or 
rules is incorporated in the argument section of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant and co-defendant Michael Dale Lovegren were 
charged by information with possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv) (Supp. 1993) (R. 1). 
2 
Defendant and Lovegren filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
seized by the arresting officii ill- li. i M M i .in v 'Mdeui iai y 
hearing and submission ol; niemorandum by both parties, the trial 
court denied the motion in .-. signed memorandum decision (R, 18-
2 7 , 2 8 - 4 3 , 4*±y . l i i e ('* •turf niriilH \ n|in-ji.l IxnduiM'ij u l ,1 «, 
conclusion of Taw ?p well entering a signed order denying 
defendant's motion 46-50 (Copies •* - ^ ** 'r signed 
memorandum decisior . . ; : a w . and 
its order of denial are attached hereto Addendum A B, anrl C, 
respectively.) 
Defendant was • * >TI » J < Mil I I I« >> i i i bene L trial
 # and 
the trial court sentenced him to a term of one to 15 years in the 
Utah State Prison. The Court, however, suspended imposition of 
the flpntence anil placed ('lefendarii » |.».robatJon ((<'. ' J IS) (A 
copy of the trial court's "Judgment, Sentence and Order of 
Probation" is attached hereto as Addendum !)) .* 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The findings of fact entered by t! r trial court after 
an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion rni^u'ess in 
reproelui " »rei'baL,j m, beJuv* i 
On May 14, 1991 Sergeant Paul V, Mangelson, a 24 
year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol, with extensive training 
and ex|j»ei: i ein'i- I hi u i nl < 11 i law enforcement and drug 
1
 The trial court found that there was insufficient evidence 
to demonstrate that Lovegren was "participating with or aware of 
the drugs, he was merely driving the car" (R. 5 6 ) . Accordingly, 
Lovegren was found not guilty (R 57) and he is not a party to 
this appeal. 
3 
identification, stopped a vehicle for speeding 71 m.p.h. in a 65 
m.p.h. zone on 1-15 in the area of the South Nephi interchange. 
The officer had measured the speed by means of a stationary 
radar. 
2. The driver of the vehicle was the defendant, 
Michael Dale Lovegren. The vehicle was registered to the 
defendant, Scott Alan Delaney, who was a passenger in the 
vehicle• 
3. While talking with the driver, the officer smelled 
a strong odor of marijuana which was quite obvious about the 
vehicle. 
4. The officer then asked the occupants if they had 
any guns, drugs or alcohol in the vehicle. The passenger, Mr. 
Delaney, stated that he had some beer in the trunk. Both 
occupants denied there was any drugs in the vehicle. The officer 
then asked the occupants if the minded if he looked through the 
vehicle. Mr. Delaney the said, "Do you want to look in the 
trunk?". The officer replied that he would like to look in both 
the trunk and the interior. At that time both defendants seemed 
apprehensive, b[ut] gave consent by saying "Go ahead". 
5. The officer then requested both occupants to exit 
the vehicle and patted them down for weapons. The officer then 
searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle. He first 
found a cellophane bag containing marijuana on the passenger side 
of the vehicle. The officer then found a good size bindle 
containing cocaine under the pleat of the driver's seat. The 
4 
officer then placed both defendants under arrest for possession 
of controlled substances. 
)fficer then *• .-•., 
pursuant ; Highway Patrol written policy with respect 
to inventorying all vehicles that are to be separated from the 
occupants after arrest. The officer tl len fnund HI laiqe aniouji! of 
cocaine, additional marijuana and drug paraphernalia in a red 
duffle bag. 
(R. 101-03) (Findings lereafter 
"Findings" a*- Attached hereto as Addendum 
Based on its findings of fact, the trial court entered 
the following roue] us ionn Il II 
1 The stop of the subject vehicle was a 
constitutionally valid stop based upon reasonable suspicion of 
speedi 
2 The search of the subject vehicle which resulted in 
the initial discovery of M>> controlled substance was made 
pursua defendants, which was given 
voluntarily without duress as therefore a valid warrantless 
search See State v. Schlosser, 774 p.2d 1132 (Utah, 
(R. 4b 
The trial court then denied defendant's motion 
suppress following a bench trial, defendant was 
5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's finding that the vehicle owned by 
defendant, and in which defendant was a passenger, was speeding 
is not clearly erroneous because it is supported by the trooper's 
testimony. Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that 
the stop was valid. Because defendant presented no evidence to 
indicate that a reasonable officer would not normally stop a 
vehicle under similar circumstances, his claim that the stop was 
pretextual was properly rejected by the trial court. 
Similarly, the trial court's finding that defendant 
consented to a warrantless search of his vehicle is not clearly 
erroneous because it is supported by the trooper's testimony that 
defendant gave his consent. Because there is no evidence that 
indicates defendant's consent was the product of coercion or 
duress, the trial court correctly concluded that defendant's 
consent was given voluntarily. This Court should therefore 
uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress 
and affirm his conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
ARRESTING OFFICER STOPPED DEFENDANT BASED ON 
HIS HAVING OBSERVED THE VEHICLE IN WHICH 
DEFENDANT WAS A PASSENGER TRAVELING IN EXCESS 
OF THE POSTED SPEED LIMIT. 
The trial court properly determined that the trooper 
validly stopped defendant's vehicle because the trooper had 
reasonable suspicion to believe defendant's vehicle, which was 
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driven by Lovegren, was speeding. Defendant's claim that the 
stop was invalid because the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion 
is therefore i"i:ii LH'' 1*, ,L I ' ' "" t "i ,' I he stop for 
speeding was a pretext to allow the trooper an opportunity : 
search defendant's vehicle. 
A Ml: i review 
A trial court's determination that reasonable suspicion 
existed is a finding f +-- " subject to t: deferenti; 
i Jtate v. Mendoza, :±o i'.2d 181, 
183 (Utah 1987); State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 667-68 (Utah 
App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P 2d 1042 (Utah -• — . state v. 
Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah ADD. 1990): State v. Talbot, 
792 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 
941-42 (Utah App. 1988) . See also Stat.. Aocneli 
Adv. Rep, J ii, I,1 I itah A p p 3 993) (Bench, T concurring, 
joined by Jackson, (arguing that Mendoza's standard of review 
has not been altered by 8 tate v rnurman. 
19:93)) But see State v. Munsen, P?n P ?. >.:a;. app.. .^v±) 
(applying nondeferential, "correction of error" standard in 
reversing trial c u m I " i i ease W\H\\ I < HIIS| I I i' i \ HI l«t e t m i Udi. J UII i , 
cert, denied, 84,3 I ".2d 516 (Utah 1992). Factual findings are not 
clearly erroneous unless they are against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or the appellate count rFHrlip*1 a "d^i i n 11 e and liim 
conviction" that the trial court was mistaken. State v. Webb. 
790 P.2d 65, 62 (Utah App. lyyoj. 
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B. Reasonable Suspicion Standard 
There is reasonable suspicion to justify an 
investigative stop if, from the facts apparent to an officer and 
the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the officer would 
reasonably suspect that criminal activity is afoot. Terrv v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d at 667. 
See also State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah App. 1992). 
"This suspicion must be 'based upon articulated "objective facts" 
then apparent to the officer.'" Roth. 827 P.2d at 257 (quoting 
Sandv Citv v. Thorsness. 778 P.2d 1011, 1012 (Utah App. 1989)). 
Reasonable suspicion "is considerably less than proof of 
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). The level of suspicion required 
for an investigative stop "is obviously less demanding than that 
for probable cause." Ibid. In evaluating the validity of such a 
stop, a court must consider "'the totality of the circumstances 
-- the whole picture.'" Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). See also Roth. 827 P.2d at 
257. As Sokolow notes: 
"The process does not deal with hard 
certainties, but with probabilities. Long 
before the law of probabilities was 
articulated as such, practical people 
formulated certain common-sense conclusions 
about human behavior; jurors as factfinders 
are permitted to do the same -- and so are 
law enforcement officers." 
Ibid, (quoting Cortez. 449 U.S. at 418). 
Furthermore, that the behavior may be as consistent 
with innocent conduct as criminal does not defeat a finding of 
8 
reasonable suspicion. As the Supreme Court said in Sokolow: 
11
' [T]here could, of course, be circumstances in which wholly 
lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity 
was afoot.' Indeed, Terry itself involved 'a series of acts, 
each of them perhaps innocent' if viewed separately, 'but which 
taken together warranted further investigation.'" 490 U.S. at 9-
10 (quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per 
curiam); Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)). 
C. The Instant Case 
Here, the trial court found that there was reasonable 
suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle for speeding. 
Specifically, the trial court found that defendant's vehicle was 
traveling at a rate of 71 m.p.h. in a 65 m.p.h zone (R. 47). 
Although defendant argues on appeal that this finding is clearly 
erroneous because Lovegren testified that their vehicle was going 
no faster than 60 m.p.h., five miles under the posted speed limit 
(R. 154-55), that does not compel the conclusion that the trial 
court's finding is clearly erroneous. Rather, because the 
arresting trooper testified that he clocked the defendant's 
vehicle at 71 m.p.h. by radar (R. 112-13), there is competent 
evidence to support the trial court's finding of fact. The trial 
court's finding is therefore not clearly erroneous. 
Moreover, the logical inference to be drawn from the 
court's finding that the car was traveling 71 m.p.h. is that the 
court found the trooper's testimony more credible than that of 
the two defendants. The determination of what testimony to 
9 
believe is essentially a question of witness credibility, which 
is best resolved by the trial court given its advantaged position 
to judge the demeanor of each witness. See, e.g., State v. 
Harcrraves, 806 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah App. 1991). 
Here, defendant's and Lovegren's testimony that they 
had a radar detector so that they could travel in excess of the 
posted speed limit is difficult reconcile with their claim that 
they were traveling five miles per hour under the posted speed 
limit (R. 148-49, 155, 158). Moreover, Lovegren testified that 
he passed two other vehicles just before he saw the trooper in 
his rear view mirror (R. 154, 159). According to Lovegren, he 
again looked at his speedometer and saw that it read 60 miles per 
hour (R. 159). Given that the posted speed limit was 65 m.p.h., 
the trial court could have reasonably rejected all of Lovegren's 
testimony because it is difficult to believe he could have passed 
two other vehicles if he was only going 60 miles per hour. 
Defendant's and Lovegren's testimony appears even less credible 
when coupled with their insistence that the radar detector never 
indicated the presence of a radar gun, which might well have 
bolstered their claim that they were not speeding at the time 
they drove by the trooper (R. 149, 159). 
In short, although the testimony on the issue of how 
fast the defendant's vehicle was traveling was conflicted, 
defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's 
finding that defendant's vehicle was speeding is against the 
clear weight of the evidence. Given the trooper's testimony, it 
10 
cannot be said that the trial court clearly erred in finding that 
the defendant's vehicle was travelling at 71 m.p.h. in a 65 
m.p.h. zone. 
Not only does defendant argue that the trooper lacked 
reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle for speeding, he also 
asserts the officer did not have any basis to stop the vehicle 
for suspicion of narcotics trafficking and that the stop for 
speeding was therefore pretextual. Accordingly, defendant claims 
the stop of the car was unconstitutional. As demonstrated below, 
defendant's argument should be summarily rejected. 
Even though the trooper eventually investigated the 
possibility that defendant and Lovegren were transporting illegal 
narcotics, such did not undermine the legality of the stop for 
the speeding violation. It is well settled that lf[w]hether a 
Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective 
assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and 
circumstances confronting him at the time, and not on the 
officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action 
was taken." Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985) 
(citations omitted). Accord Scott v. United States. 436 U.S. 
128, 138 (1978). The act of speeding, committed in the trooper's 
presence, supplied reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's 
vehicle. State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 702 (Utah App. 1992); 
United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 815, reh'a denied. 941 
F.2d 1086 (10th Cir. 1991) (both holding stop for speeding was 
valid). 
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This Court applies the following standard for 
determining whether a pretext stop has occurred: fl[I]f a 
hypothetical reasonable police officer would not have stopped the 
driver for the cited offense, and the surrounding circumstances 
indicate the stop is a pretext, the stop is unconstitutional." 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 979 (Utah App. 1988), disavowed on 
other grounds. State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990)• 
The inquiry focuses on whether the reasonable officer would have 
made a stop under the circumstances, not whether the officer 
could have made a stop. Id. at 978; State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 
1040, 1046 (Utah App.), cert, granted. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
The test is an objective one, which looks to usual police 
practice to determine whether the reasonable officer would have 
made the stop. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78; Lopez. 831 P.2d at 
1048-49. lf[T]he officer's subjective motivation is not the 
relevant inquiry." Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1047 (citing Sierra, 754 
P.2d at 977).2 Defendant's pretext argument, which focuses on 
2The Lopez majority opinion is not altogether clear on the 
relevance of the officer's subjective intent to the pretext 
inquiry. For example, it consistently defines the pretext 
standard as the "objective question of whether a reasonable 
officer would have made the stop under the same circumstances 
absent the illegal [or unconstitutional] motivation." Lopez, 831 
P.2d at 1047 (second emphasis added). This statement arguably 
leaves the door open to consideration of the officer's subjective 
intent. However, in light of the majority's repeated 
admonishments that the officer's subjective intent is not 
relevant, e.g., ibid, ("a focus on an individual officer's 
subjective intent as the measure of whether a stop is a pretext 
would violate the United State Supreme Court's ruling that the 
Fourth Amendment mandates an objective inquiry into police 
activity"), the State's discussion of pretext doctrine assumes 
this Court intends that an officer's subjective intent be 
irrelevant. 
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the trooper's alleged subjective intent concerning possible 
narcotics trafficking, must therefore fail because it is 
unsupported by case law. 
Beyond asserting that the stop was pretextual, 
defendant makes no effort to show that the reasonable officer 
would not normally stop for the traffic violation that occurred 
here. In fact, he did not do this below. Even on appeal, 
defendant appears to be laboring under the misapprehension that 
it is the State's burden to prove that the stop was not 
pretextual: "Appellant submits that the [S]tate has not met its 
burden to establish the factual basis for the stop to be a 
legitimate function of law enforcement other than to provide an 
opportunity for the trooper to search for drugs." Br. of App. at 
9. 
Defendant's allocation of the burden of proof is 
mistaken. As this Court made clear in Lopez, once the State has 
established that a traffic violation occurred in the officer's 
presence or that the officer had probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion to believe a traffic violation had occurred, the 
defendant who alleges pretext must point to some evidence that 
the stop was not consistent with usual police practice. Lopez, 
831 P.2d at 1049. In the absence of any such evidence, the 
pretext argument necessarily fails. See State v. Ficrueroa-
Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 282 (Utah App. 1992) (Orme, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the result in part, joined by Billings, 
J.) (lack of any evidence offered by defendant to counter the 
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objectively reasonable conduct of officer defeated defendant's 
pretext claim). Accordingly, this Court should reject 
defendant's pretext argument because it is based on his 
unsubstantiated and irrelevant allegations concerning the 
trooper's subjective motivation and because defendant has 
presented no evidence indicating that a reasonable officer would 
not normally stop a vehicle for travelling 71 m.p.h. in a 65 
m.p.h. zone. 
POINT II 
ALTHOUGH IT IS CLEAR THAT THE OFFICER'S 
INVESTIGATION INTO SUSPECTED NARCOTICS 
TRAFFICKING WAS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF A ROUTINE 
TRAFFIC STOP, THAT INVESTIGATION AND ITS 
CONSEQUENT DETENTION WERE PROPER BECAUSE THE 
OFFICER HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE 
DEFENDANT HAD ILLEGAL NARCOTICS IN THE 
VEHICLE. 
The trooper's investigative detention of defendant for 
suspicion of narcotics trafficking was proper because it was 
supported by reasonable suspicion, and perhaps even probable 
cause, to believe that the two were carrying illegal narcotics. 
The trial court found that the trooper "smelled a 
strong odor of marijuana[,] which was quite obvious about the 
vehicle" (R. 47). The trial court's finding is amply supported 
by the record and is therefore not clearly erroneous. 
Specifically, the trooper testified that when he first walked up 
to the vehicle he smelled the odor of burnt marijuana (R. 145) 
and that he continued to smell it as he was asking the driver for 
his driver's license and explaining why he had stopped their car 
(R. 111-14). The trooper also testified that he detected the 
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odor of air fresheners coming from the vehicle, but explained 
that it was not strong enough to mask the odor of the marijuana 
(R. 126-27). 
Defendant does not challenge the trial court's finding 
that the trooper detected the odor of marijuana. Indeed, he has 
never contested the fact that there was an odor of marijuana 
about the vehicle- Rather, defendant argues that the trooper 
exceeded the scope of detention permissible for a routine traffic 
stop and that the encounter escalated into a de facto arrest 
unsupported by probable cause.3 Defendant's argument is 
misplaced because it ignores the gradual manner in which evidence 
of narcotics trafficking was observed by the trooper. That 
additional evidence justified the trooper's investigation into 
possible narcotics trafficking and the consequent detention of 
defendant. 
This Court discussed the fourth amendment parameters 
for routine traffic stops in State v. Robinson. 191 P.2d 431 
(Utah App. 1990). As explained in Robinson: 
An officer conducting a routine traffic 
stop may request a driver's license and 
vehicle registration, conduct a computer 
3
 With respect to defendant's claim that the encounter was a 
de facto arrest, it need only be noted that the record shows that 
the trooper placed handcuffs on defendant and arrested him only 
after the trooper had recovered both marijuana and cocaine from 
defendant's vehicle. Defendant has never contested those facts, 
and they clearly establish probable cause for arrest under Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (Supp. 1993) in keeping with the 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1990). Accordingly, 
because defendant has not identified any specific point prior to 
his being handcuffed at which he believes a de facto arrest 
occurred, his claim must fail. 
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check, and issue a citation. However, once 
the driver has produced a valid license and 
evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, 
"he must be allowed to proceed on his way, 
without being subject to further delay by 
police for additional questioning." Any 
further detention for investigative 
questioning after the fulfillment of the 
purpose of the initial traffic stop is 
justified under the fourth amendment only if 
the detaining officer has a reasonable 
suspicion of serious criminal activity. The 
detaining officers must be able to articulate 
a particularized and objective basis for 
their suspicions that is drawn from the 
totality of circumstances facing them at the 
time of the seizure. 
Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435 (citations omitted). 
In the instant case, the trooper questioned defendant 
and the driver about matters unrelated to the purpose of the 
initial traffic stop -- including questions concerning whether 
there was any contraband in the vehicle. The State agrees with 
defendant that this questioning was beyond the bounds of that 
allowed during a routine traffic stop and transformed the 
encounter into an investigative detention requiring reasonable 
suspicion of other criminal activity. See id. See also State v. 
Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654 (Utah App. 1992). The record 
makes clear, however, that the trooper had the requisite 
reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the additional 
investigative questioning and the consequent detention of 
defendant. 
Under the plain smell doctrine, the trooper's detection 
of the odor of marijuana would have supported a finding of 
probable cause to search for additional marijuana in the vehicle. 
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See State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 972-73 (Utah App. 1992) 
(where officer smelled marijuana the trial court's finding of 
probable cause was proper under the "plain smell" doctrine). 
This Court could affirm that trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress on that alternative ground. See generally 
fftate v. Brvon, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985) (a reviewing court may 
affirm on any proper grounds "even though the trial court 
assigned another reason for its ruling"). 
In this case, however, Mangelson also relied on his 
observations that indicated the presence of marijuana to support 
his request for consent to search the vehicle. Certainly, the 
trooper's request for consent was justified because the odor of 
marijuana provided at least reasonable suspicion to believe that 
the vehicle contained marijuana. See, e.g., People v. Lusardi, 
228 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 280 Cal.Rptr. 80, 81 (Cal. Super. 1991) 
(an officer making a traffic stop may not properly ask for 
consent to search a vehicle absent reasonable suspicion to 
believe the vehicle contains unlawful material). Because the 
trooper reasonably suspected that there were illegal drugs in 
defendant's vehicle, his investigative questioning and the 
consequent detention of defendant was constitutionally valid. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT DEPENDANT 
CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OP HIS VEHICLE IS NOT 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND ITS DETERMINATION THAT 
HIS CONSENT WAS GIVEN VOLUNTARILY IS CORRECT. 
The trial court properly determined that defendant in 
fact consented to the search by responding "Go ahead" when the 
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trooper asked if he could search the vehicle and concluded that 
defendant's consent was "given voluntarily without duress" (R. 
47-8). In reviewing the trial court's determination that 
defendant told the trooper to "Go ahead" and search the vehicle, 
this Court applies a clearly erroneous standard of review. The 
trial court's ultimate conclusion that defendant's consent was 
given voluntarily is, however, reviewed for correctness. See 
State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 26 (Utah Jan 7, 1993) 
(holding that a "trial court's ultimate conclusion that a consent 
was voluntary or involuntary is to be reviewed for correctness[;] 
[however,] [t]he trial court's underlying factual findings will 
not be set aside unless they are found to be clearly erroneous." 
(citations omitted)). As demonstrated below, there is ample 
record evidence to support the trial court's determination on 
both points. 
A. The Standard of Proof for Demonstrating Consent is 
the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard. 
Before addressing the merit's of defendant's challenge 
to the trial court's determination of voluntary consent, a 
discussion of the applicable standard of proof is in order. 
Defendant properly notes that this Court in State v. Carter, 812 
P.2d 460, 467 n.7 (Utah App. 1991), declined to determine whether 
the State was required to prove consent by a preponderance of the 
evidence -- the widely accepted standard of proof applied at 
suppression hearings -- or by the more stringent clear and 
convincing standard of proof advocated by a small minority of 
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jurisdictions. Understandably, defendant urges this Court to 
adopt the clear and convincing standard of proof. However, the 
overwhelming majority of case law, including case law from both 
the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court, makes 
clear that the proper standard of proof for suppression hearings 
in Utah is the preponderance of the evidence standard. 
Although this Court has in some cases implied a 
preference for the clear and convincing standard of proof by 
embracing the standard espoused in United States v. Abbott. 546 
F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1976), it does not appear to have expressly 
adopted any standard of proof for suppression hearings. See 
State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 82 (utah App. 1990); State v. 
Marshall. 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 800 P.2d 1105 
(Utah 1990); State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah App. 1991) 
(embracing Abbott). But see Carter. 812 P.2d at 467 n.7; (noting 
that "this court has not precisely dealt with the issue of the 
proper burden of proof required to prove voluntary consent" and 
declining to specify applicable standard of proof under the facts 
presented). 
The Abbott test for determining consent is as follows: 
(1) There must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was "unequivocal 
and specific" and "freely and intelligently 
given"; (2) the government must prove consent 
was given without duress or coercion, express 
or implied; and (3) the courts must indulge 
every reasonable presumption against the 
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights 
and there must be convincing evidence that 
such rights were waived. 
Webb. 790 P.2d at 82 (quoting Abbott. 546 F.2d at 885 (quoting in 
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turn Villano v. United States. 310 F.2d 680, 694 (10th Cir. 
1962)). This standard has been questioned as being an unduly 
strict standard of proof for suppression hearings. See, e.g.. 
United States v. Miller. 589 F.2d 1117, 1130-31 (1st Cir. 1978), 
cert, denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979). Indeed, insofar as the Abbott 
standard imposes a clear and convincing standard of proof on the 
government, it is contrary to the view expressed by the United 
States Supreme Court that the government need only prove 
voluntary consent to search by a preponderance of the evidence. 
See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14., 94 S. Ct. 
988, 996 n.14 (1974) (where, in reviewing the voluntariness of a 
consent to a warrantless search, the Court said the "controlling 
burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater 
burden that proof by a preponderance of the evidence"); Bouriailv 
v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987) (citing Matlock for 
the principle that "voluntariness of consent to search must be 
shown by a preponderance of the evidence"). It is also contrary 
to the clear majority view that voluntariness of consent is 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., United 
States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Chaidez, 906 F.2d. 377 (8th Cir. 1990); White Fabricating Company 
v. United States, 903 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1990); People v. Harris, 
557 N.E.2d 1277 (111. App. 1990); State v. Cross. 576 A.2d 1366 
(Me. 1990); State v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d 425 (R.I. 1990); People v. 
Henderson, 220 Cal. App.3d 1632, 270 Cal.Rptr. 248 (1990). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently recognized the 
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applicability of the preponderance of the evidence standard at 
suppression hearings. State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 
1992). In Brown, the Court was faced with the question of 
whether the trial court had properly determined the owner of a 
company work camp occupied by its employees had common authority 
with defendant and the other residents of the camp over at least 
the common areas of a particular trailer from which evidence was 
seized. Id. In its Brown brief, the State relied on Matlock and 
urged the Court to adopt the preponderance of evidence standard 
of proof for suppression hearings. See State's Brief in Brown at 
page 17 n.8, a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum E. 
In analyzing the issue on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
expressly relied on Matlock in adopting the preponderance of the 
evidence standard of proof: 
The State bears the burden of proving common 
authority, and it must do so by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Matlock. 415 
U.S. at 177, 178 n.14, 94 S. Ct. at 996, 996 
n.14 (ff[T]he controlling burden of proof at 
suppression hearings should impose no greater 
burden that proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence."). 
Brown. 853 P.2d at 855. 
The Utah Supreme Court's adoption of the Matlock 
preponderance of the evidence standard is well measured, and this 
Court should similarly recognize its applicability to the 
question of consent. While acceptance of the preponderance of 
the evidence standard in this context is not universal, see 4 
LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.2(c) at 236-37 (1987), the 
United States Supreme Court has made clear that that standard is 
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appropriate, thus explaining the majority view and the Utah 
Supreme Court's acceptance of Matlock. As the Fifth Circuit said 
in overruling its prior decisions that had adopted a clear and 
convincing standard of proof: 
Since 1972, the Supreme Court has stated 
that the preponderance of evidence standard 
supplies the burden which [sic] the 
government must carry to defeat a defendant;s 
motion to suppress evidence when the motion 
concerns the voluntariness of a confession, 
Leao v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 482-89, 92 S. 
Ct. 619, 623-26, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972), the 
voluntariness of consent to a warrantless 
search, United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 
164, 177 n. 14., 94 S. Ct. 988, 996 n. 14, 39 
L.Ed.2d 242 (1974), the inevitable discovery 
of evidence, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 
444 n. 5, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2509 n. 5, 81 
L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), or the waiver of Miranda 
rights, Colorado v. Connelly. 479 U.S. 157, 
107 S. Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). 
In conformity with the rationale 
announced by the Supreme Court, we overrule 
our previous decisions requiring the 
government at a suppression hearing to prove 
voluntariness [of consent to search] by clear 
and convincing evidence. lf[T]he controlling 
burden of proof at suppression hearings 
should impose no greater burden that proof by 
a preponderance of the evidence.If United 
States v. Matlock. 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 
94 S. Ct. 988, 996 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 
(1974) . 
United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d at 76. 
In Lego v. Twomey. the Supreme Court explained its 
rationale for the preponderance standard: 
Since the purpose that a voluntariness 
hearing is designed to serve has nothing 
whatever to do with improving the reliability 
of jury verdicts, we cannot accept the charge 
that judging the admissibility of a 
confession by a preponderance of the evidence 
undermines the mandate of In re Winship, 397 
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U.S. 358# 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 
(1970). Our decision in Winship was not 
concerned with the standards for determining 
the admissibility of evidence or with the 
prosecution's burden of proof at a 
suppression hearing when evidence is 
challenged on constitutional grounds. 
Winship went no further that to confirm the 
fundamental right that protects "the accused 
against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is 
charged." Id. at 364, 90 S. Ct., at 1072. . 
A guilty verdict is not rendered less 
reliable simply because the admissibility of 
a confession is determined by a less 
stringent standard. . . . 
404 U.S. at 486-87. The Court also rejected the argument that 
the admissibility of evidence challenged on constitutional 
grounds should be determined under a stricter standard of proof 
in order to protect the values that the exclusionary rules are 
designed to protect: 
The argument is straightforward and has 
appeal. But we are unconvinced that merely 
emphasizing the importance of the values 
served by the exclusionary rules is itself 
sufficient demonstration that the 
Constitution also requires admissibility to 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment has been excluded from federal 
criminal trials for years. The same is true 
of coerced confessions offered in federal or 
state trials. But, from our experience over 
this period of time no substantial evidence 
has accumulated that federal rights have 
suffered from determining admissibility by a 
preponderance of the evidence. . . . Without 
good cause, we are unwilling to expand 
currently applicable exclusionary rules by 
erecting additional barriers to placing 
truthful and probative evidence before state 
juries . . . . Sound reason for moving 
further in this direction has not been 
offered here nor do we discern any at the 
present time. This is particularly true 
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since the exclusionary rules are very much 
aimed at deterring lawless conduct by the 
police and prosecution[,] and it is very 
doubtful that escalating the prosecution's 
burden of proof in Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
suppression hearings would be sufficiently 
productive in this respect to outweigh the 
public interest in placing probative evidence 
before juries for the purpose of arriving at 
truthful decision about guilt or innocence. 
404 U.S. at 487-89 (citations and footnote omitted). 
Although the Court said that "the States are free, 
pursuant to their own law, to adopt a higher standard[,] [in 
that] [t]hey may indeed differ as to the appropriate resolution 
of the values they find at stake," id. at 489, the Utah Supreme 
Court expressly adopted the preponderance of evidence standard in 
Brown. In so doing, the Court implicitly accepted the State's 
invitation to do so "[b]ased upon the rational . . . expressed in 
Leao [.]" See Addendum E. This Court should follow the course 
established by the Utah Supreme Court in Brown and definitively 
recognize that the controlling standard of proof at suppression 
hearings is the preponderance of the evidence standard. 
B. Defendant Consented to the Search of his Vehicle. 
As defendant notes in his brief, the testimony about 
the events surrounding Trooper Mangelson's request to search the 
vehicle are consistent up to a point. Specifically, it is 
undisputed that the trooper asked defendant and the driver: "Do 
you mind if I look through the vehicle?" and that defendant 
answered first by asking, "Do you want to look in the trunk?" (R. 
128). It is also undisputed that the trooper then responded, 
"Yes and I also would like to look in the interior" (R. 128). At 
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that point, however, the testimony of the trooper and that of the 
two defendants comes into conflict. 
According to both defendant and the driver, neither of 
them consented to the search of the vehicle interior (R. 150-52, 
156-57, 160). In contrast, the trooper testified that, although 
the two appeared apprehensive, they responded "go ahead" (R. 
138). The trial court resolved this conflicting testimony in 
favor of the trooper's account of what happened (R. 45, 47). The 
determination of whom to believe is a matter to be resolved by 
the finder of fact and --in this case --is essentially a matter 
of evaluating witness credibility. See, e.g.. State v. 
Harcrraves, 806 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah App. 1991) (trial court is in 
the best position to weigh witness credibility). Accordingly, 
although defendant correctly notes that there was conflicting 
testimony, he has failed to demonstrate that the trial court 
clearly erred in finding that defendant told the trooper to "go 
ahead" when the trooper asked for consent to search the vehicle's 
interior. 
C. The Trial Court Properly Determined that 
Defendant's Consent to the Search was Given Voluntarily. 
In addition to arguing that he did not in fact consent 
to the search of the vehicle's interior, defendant also argues 
that — assuming he did consent to the search -- the trial court 
erred in finding that his consent was given voluntarily. Under 
the facts of this case, the trial court's determination that 
defendant's consent was given voluntarily should be upheld. 
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A warrantless search conducted pursuant to voluntary 
consent is valid under the fourth amendment. State v. Sepulveda. 
200 Utah Adv. Rep. 72, 75 (Utah App. 1992). "'Whether the 
requisite voluntariness exists depends on the "totality of all 
the surrounding circumstances - both the characteristics of the 
accused and the details of" police conduct.'" Thurman, 203 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 21 (quoting State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 
1990), in turn quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
226 1973)). "Both the 'characteristics of the accused' and the 
'details of police conduct' must be considered in determining 
whether a defendant's consent was actually a product of his or 
her free will. The prosecution bears the burden of proving that 
the defendant's consent was voluntary." Id. (citations omitted). 
After an evidentiary hearing and following the 
submission of memorandum from both parties, the trial court 
concluded: "The search of the subject vehicle[,] which resulted 
in the initial discovery of the controlled substance[,] was made 
pursuant to consent given by both defendants, which consent was 
given voluntarily without duress" (R. 48) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the question to be addressed by this Court is 
whether there was evidence that supported the trial court's 
conclusion. As demonstrated below, the court's ruling is 
correct. 
To determine whether consent to search was given 
voluntarily, a totality of the circumstances test is applied to 
ensure that the consent was in fact voluntary and not the result 
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of "duress or coercion, express or implied" Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
at 227. Defendant claims his consent was not given voluntarily 
because the trooper's decision not to use a written consent form 
-- coupled with the trooper's testimony that he would have 
searched defendant's vehicle even if defendant had refused 
consent and the fact that defendant was not told he had a right 
to refuse consent -- indicates that defendant's consent was not 
freely given. Defendant's contention is erroneous. 
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor Utah courts 
have ever required that a person be informed of their right to 
refuse consent in order for a consent to be deemed voluntary. 
See, e.g.. State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980) 
(prosecution is not required to prove that defendant knew of his 
right to refuse consent in order to show consent was voluntary). 
See generally, Schneckloth. 412 U.S. at 227 (knowledge of right 
to refuse consent only one factor to evaluate in determining 
whether consent was voluntary). Similarly, the mere fact that 
the trooper elected not to ask defendant to sign a written 
consent form after obtaining his verbal consent to search the 
vehicle does not demonstrate that the consent was not voluntary. 
Rather, that decision goes to the weight of the evidence admitted 
to support the claim of voluntary consent. Cf. Hargraves, 806 
P.2d at 231 ("Hargraves signed the consent form, an act further 
evidencing voluntary consent"). 
Finally, the trooper's testimony to the effect that he 
would have searched defendant's vehicle based solely on his 
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having detected the strong odor of marijuana about the vehicle is 
inconsequential. Although the trooper testified that he 
requested consent simply as a "formality" because he preferred to 
obtain consent to search when possible, there is nothing in the 
record that indicates the trooper told defendant that he would 
search the car even if defendant refused to consent. 
Accordingly, the trooper's testimony that he did not believe he 
needed defendant's consent to search the vehicle because he could 
have searched it based on probable cause in no way indicates that 
defendant's consent was the product of duress or coercion. 
Rather, it is indicative of the trooper's understanding of the 
law and his desire to provide an alternate basis for justifying 
his search of the vehicle in the event a court later determined 
the search was not supported by probable cause. 
In summary, the trial court properly concluded that 
defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle. 
"Although there was evidence to the contrary by way of 
[defendant's and Lovegren's] testimony, the trial court was in 
the best position to weigh testimonial credibility and there was 
sufficient evidence to support the court's finding that there was 
no coercion[.]" Hargraves, 806 P.2d at 231. Because defendant 
said, "Go ahead" when the trooper requested permission to search 
the vehicle interior -- and there was no evidence of express or 
implied coercion or duress -- the trial court's determination 
that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle 
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should be upheld.4 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress 
and affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this I^L day of September, 
1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
-KSCXUIII* ^ ^ — 
TODD A. UTZINGER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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September, 1993. 
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4
 Defendant has not challenged the validity of his consent 
under the attenuation prong of the two-pronged Thunnan test, and 
the issue was not addressed in the proceedings below. 
Accordingly, the State's analysis on appeal is necessarily 
limited to the voluntariness of defendant's consent. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
 s , 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 1/ - •
 0 „ _ 
*********** 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. CASE NUMBER: 76E 
SCOTT ALAN DELANEY 
MICHAEL DALE LOVEGREN, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Defendant. 
************ 
The Court having reviewed the arguments and memoranda 
presented on defendants' Motion to Suppress Evidence hereby 
denies such motion. The Court finds that defendants were 
traveling north on Interstate 15 near milepost 221 on May 14, 
1991, when they were stopped for speeding 71 mph in a 65 posted 
zone. Officer Mangleson, upon approaching the car, testified 
that he smelled a "strong odor of marijuana19 which "was quite 
obvious about the vehicle.w 
Officer Mangleson then inquired if the defendants had 
"contraband in the vehicle, such as drugs alcohol or weapons." 
The passenger stated that "there was alcohol in the trunk.91 
Officer Mangleson then asked for permission to search the 
vehicle. The passenger then stated, wDo you want to look in the 
trunk?" The officer replied that he would like to look in both 
the trunk and the interior. At that time the both defendants 
seemed apprehensive, but did give consent by saying, "Go ahead." 
The Court finds according to testimony given, that Officer 
Mangleson had permission given voluntarily, without duress, to 
search the vehicle. In State v. Schlosser 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 
(Utah 1989), the court found that "when stopping a car for a 
traffic infraction, an officer may make a warrantless search of 
the automobile ... if there is probable cause or consent of the 
detainee." 
Counsel for the plaintiff to prepare Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and an Order within 15 days of this decision 
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to 
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to 
the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no effect 
until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 20th day of December, 1991. 
cc: Donald J. Eyre, Esq. 
Michael D. Esplin, Esq. 
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ADDENDUM B 
r
 d V, d Ohtrtct Court, Jufcb County 
F I L E D 
Pat P. Greenwood.Clerk — . D e p u t y 
Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021 
Juab County Attorney 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: 623-1141 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SCOTT ALAN DELANEY and 
MICHAEL DALE LOVEGREN, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Criminal No. 76-E 
The above entitled natter came on regularly for hearing on 
November 15, 1991 upon the Defendants9 Motion To Suppress before 
the Honorable Ray M. Harding. The defendants were present and 
represented by their attorney, Michael D. Esplin. The State of 
Utah was represented by Donald J. Eyre Jr., Juab County Attorney. 
The Court having heard the evidence introduced by both the 
plaintiff and defendant, reviewed the Memorandums of Law and 
arguments of counsel, and having submitted its Memorandum Decision 
dated December 20, 1991. 
The Court being fully advised in the premises makes the 
following: 
1 
MO 
TINPIPgg PF TACT 
1. On May 14, 1991 Sergeant Paul V. Mangelson, a 24 year 
veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol, with extensive training and 
experience in the area of drug law enforcement and drug 
identification, stopped a vehicle for speeding 71 m.p.h. in a 65 
m.p.h. zone on 1*15 in the area of the South Nephi interchange. 
The officer had measured the speed by means of a stationary radar. 
2. The driver of the vehicle was the defendant, Michael Dale 
Lovegren. The vehicle was registered to the defendant, Scott Alan 
Delaney, who was a passenger in the vehicle. 
3. While talking with the driver, the officer smelled a 
strong odor of marijuana which was quite obvious about the vehicle. 
4. The officer then asked the occupants if they had any guns, 
drugs or alcohol in the vehicle. The passenger, Mr. Delaney, 
stated that he had some beer in the trunk. Both occupants denied 
there was any drugs in the vehicle. The officer then asked the 
occupants if they minded if he looked through the vehicle. Mr. 
Delaney then said, "Do you want to look in the trunk?91. The 
officer replied that he would like to look in both the trunk and 
the interior. At that time both defendants seemed apprehensive, 
by gave consent by saying "Go ahead99. 
5. The officer then requested both occupants to exit the 
vehicle and patted them down for weapons. The officer then 
2 
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searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle. He first found 
a cellophane bag containing marijuana on the passenger side of the 
vehicle. The officer then found a good size bindle containing 
cocaine under the pleat of the driver's seat. The officer then 
placed both defendants under arrest for possession of controlled 
substances• 
6. The officer then continued to search the vehicle, pursuant 
to the Utah Highway Patrol written policy with respect to 
inventorying all vehicles that are to be separated from the 
occupants after arrest. The officer then found a large amount of 
cocaine, additional marijuana and drug paraphernalia in a red 
duffle bag. 
Pursuant to the above Findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
following: 
CQNCLVSIQF? PF LAW 
1. The stop of the subject vehicle was a constitutionally 
valid stop based upon reasonable suspicion of speeding. 
2. The search of the subject vehicle which resulted in the 
initial discovery of the controlled substance was made pursuant to 
consent given by both defendants, which consent was given 
voluntarily without duress. It was therefore a valid warrantless 
search. See State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah, 1989). 
3 
3. The Defendants9 Motion to Suppress should be denied. 
Dated this day of ^g-^cs "_ , 1992, 
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ADDENDUM C 
, - l C t DIatrtet Court, Jutb Csunty 
F l U D 
. - > '. 
Pat P. Greenwood;Cierk Deputy 
Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021 
Juab County Attorney 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: 623-1141 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SCOTT ALAN DELANEY and 
MICHAEL DALE LOVEGREN, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Criminal No. 76-E 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
previously entered by the Court; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
Defendants' Motion to Suppress is denied. 
Dated this /<C day of IP&P^T . 1992. 
District Judae-^ 
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ADDENDUM D 
Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021 
Juab County Attorney 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: 623-1141 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : JUDGMENT, SENTENCE AND 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
vs. : 
Criminal No. 76-E 
SCOTT ALAN DELANEY, : 
Defendant. : 
An Information having been filed charging the defendant, Scott 
Alan Delaney, with the second degree felony of possessing cocaine 
with the intent to distribute. 
A trial was held on May 27, 1992 to the bench, and the Court 
issued its Memorandum Decision dated July 9, 1992. The Court has 
also issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order. 
The matter was referred to the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole for the preparation of a pre-sentence report. 
The defendant and his attorney, Michael D. Esplin, appeared 
on October 22, 1992 for the entry of Judgment and Sentencing. No 
legal reason having been given why Judgment should not be entered. 
1 
It is the Judgment of the Court that the defendant is guilty of the 
second degree felony of possession of cocaine with the intent to 
distribute. The defendant is sentenced to serve an indeterminate 
sentence in the Utah State Prison of not less than one nor more 
than fifteen years. 
Imposition of the prison sentence is suspended upon successful 
completion of a thirty-six month probation under the following 
terms and conditions: 
1. The defendant enter into an agreement with Adult Probation 
and Parole and abide strictly with its terms and conditions. 
2. The defendant report to the Court and to the Department 
whenever required. 
3. The defendant is to violate no law either federal, state 
or municipal. 
4. The defendant is to serve 60 days in the Juab County jail 
with credit for four days already served. The Court will stay all 
but 30 days of the sentence upon defendant's performance of the 
other conditions of probation. The sentence is to be served within 
the next 120 days in not less than 3 day increments. 
5. The defendant is to pay a fine in the amount of $500.00 
and to pay a surcharge in the amount of $425.00. 
6. The defendant is not# to use or possess alcohol and/or 
drugs while on probation. 
2 
7. The defendant is to submit to random alcohol and drug 
testing without the necessity of a warrant. 
8. The defendant is to attend an Alcoholics Anonymous and 
Narcotics Anonymous session at least once a week. If alcohol 
and/or drugs are found in the system, the defendant shall be 
required to enter into an intensive out-patient substance abuse 
treatment program. 
Dated this ^€^ day 
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ADDENDUM E 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Appellee, t Case No. 900148 
v. t 
DONALD WAYNE BROWN. t Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. t 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS OF SECOND DEGREE 
MURDER, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, UNDER UTAH 
CODE ANN. S 76-5-203 (1990), AND AGGRAVATED 
ASSAULT, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY UNDER UTAH 
CODE ANN. S 76-5-103 (1990), IN THE FIRST 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR BOX ELDER 
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE F. L. GUNNELL, 
PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
Attorneys for Appellee 
NATHAN HULT 
326 North 100 East 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorney for Appellant 
47 Wash.App. 620, 736 P.2d 1079, 1086 (1987). Under these 
standards, the trial court correctly concluded that the State had 
sustained its burden of proving that Bentzley had common 
authority over at least the common areas of trailer #3 and that 
he voluntarily consented to the police entry into the common 
areas• 
Trailer #3 was readily accessible to all employees of 
the camp, at least with respect to those parts of the trailer 
that contained the perishable food and the radios—items that 
were available to and used by all employees. Thus, there were 
recognized "common areas" within the trailer. Furthermore, the 
door to trailer #3 was never locked. And although courtesies 
such as not entering a trailer when its occupants were not there 
and knocking on a trailer's door before entering were generally 
followed by the camp's employees, there appears to be no dispute 
that any employee was free to enter trailer #3 at any time to 
obtain food or a radio. This same freedom of access would 
reasonably apply to the owner and manager of the property, Mr. 
It does not appear that this Court has ever expressly stated 
what burden of proof applies at a suppression hearing. However, 
in Matlock, the Supreme Court made clear that "the controlling 
burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater 
burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence." 415 U.S. 
at 178 n.14 (citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488-489 
(1972)). Based upon the rationale for the preponderance standard 
expressed in Lego, 404 U.S. at 486-87, this Court should 
expressly adopt a similar standard for Utah. See, e.g.. United 
States v. Hurtado, 905 P.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990)j State v. 
Cress, 576 A.2d 1366, 1367 (Me. 1990); State v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d 
425, 427 (R.I. 1990)? People v. Henderson, 220 Cal.App.3d 1632, 
270 Cal.Rptr. 248, 257 (1990). 
Q 
Defendant challenges only the trial court's conclusion that 
Bentzley had authority to consent to the search of the trailer; 
he does not question the voluntariness of that consent. 
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